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The Work Made for Hire Doctrine 
Revisited: Startup and Technology 
Employees and the Use of Contracts in a 
Hiring Relationship 
Jon M. Garon* & Elaine D. Ziff** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law assumes that the author of a work is the 
copyright owner. For novelists, painters, and composers, this 
assumption works quite well. However, the economic realities 
are somewhat different for software companies, motion picture 
makers, and the creators of technical journals or product 
manuals. For modern industry, it is less likely that a work will 
be created by an individual author and more likely that a work 
will be developed by a team of specialists in the scope of their 
professional endeavors. Corporate employees may be located 
across the globe or in their own homes, creating interrelated 
components of a single copyrighted work. Business 
arrangements for copyright must take these conditions into 
account. 
A “work made for hire” is a copyrighted work as to which 
the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared 
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is considered the author for purposes of the Copyright Act 
and—unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a 
written instrument signed by them—owns all of the rights 
comprised in the copyright.1 Designation as a work for hire 
affects the copyright in four primary ways: ownership, term, 
moral rights, and termination rights.  If a copyrighted work is a 
work for hire, then the initial ownership vests in the employer, 
rather than the employee or contractor, and that individual 
enjoys none of the legal or beneficial attributes of authorship.2 
Current U.S. copyright law grants protection for the 
lifespan of the author plus seventy years to allow the copyright 
to benefit at least the author’s first-generation heirs.3 Such a 
measurement is inappropriate for a corporate author. Thus, a 
work for hire has a somewhat arbitrary copyright term of “95 
years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 
years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first.”4 
This remains true even if the employer happens to be an 
individual with a measurable lifespan.5 
The Copyright Act also explicitly specifies that a work 
created as a work for hire cannot have protections under the 
Visual Artists Rights Act, the limited moral rights protections 
under U.S. copyright law.6 As a result, a work of art such as an 
oil painting, sculpture, or façade that is created as a work for 
hire will not have any of the protections afforded an artist 
under that Act to protect his or her right to claim authorship of 
the work and to prevent the mutilation or destruction of the 
work.7 
Perhaps, most significantly, the statutory protection for 
authors to terminate grants of copyright, whether by 
 1. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006). These rights are: (1) the rights to reproduce 
the copyrighted work, (2) prepare derivative works of it, (3) distribute copies to 
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental, lease or lending, 
(4) perform and/or display the work publicly, (5) or, in the case of sound 
recordings, perform the work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission. Id. § 106. 
 2. Id. § 201(b). 
 3. Id. § 302(a) (applying to works created on or after January 1, 1978). 
 4. Id. § 302(c). 
 5. See id. 
 6. Id. §§ 101, 106A. The definition of “work of visual art” expressly 
excludes any work made for hire. Id. 
 7. Id.; See e.g., Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2003); Carter v. 
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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assignment or license, does not apply to works for hire.8 A 
copyright has historically been treated as having two separate 
grant terms for most authors—an initial term and a renewal 
term.9 Although this two-term structure was dropped in the 
current 1976 Copyright Act, one key aspect of this model was 
retained: an author can terminate an assignee’s or licensee’s 
right to the renewal term of works copyrighted prior to the 
1976 Copyright Act10 or can terminate any license or transfer 
of a copyright made after January 1, 1978 (the effective date of 
the 1976 Copyright Act) between thirty-five and fourty years 
after the grant was made.11 
Since the copyright in a work for hire initially vests in the 
employer rather than the employee, the law does not treat the 
arrangement as a transfer of the copyright and, therefore, does 
not provide the author the right to terminate the grant.12 The 
law also precludes the employer from using the Copyright Act 
termination provisions to terminate its own grants to third 
parties.13 The elimination of the termination provisions 
provides greater confidence that works created in the 
employment environment will not be later recaptured through 
 8. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c)–(d). 
 9. See id. § 304(c). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. § 203(a). 
(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a 
period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the 
date of execution of the grant; or, if the grant covers the right of 
publication of the work, the period begins at the end of thirty-five 
years from the date of publication of the work under the grant or at 
the end of forty years from the date of execution of the grant, 
whichever term ends earlier. 
(4) The termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in 
writing, signed by the number and proportion of owners of 
termination interests required under clauses (1) and (2) of this 
subsection, or by their duly authorized agents, upon the grantee or 
the grantee’s successor in title. 
Id.  
 12. Id. §§ 203(a), 304(c)–(d). The estate of comic book artist, Jack Kirby, 
who is recognized for superhero characters like Iron Man and Spiderman, 
recently served fourty-five notices of copyright termination on Marvel 
Entertainment. In response, Marvel filed a lawsuit in New York Federal 
District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that various comic book 
creations were works for hire. The case is potentially worth billions of dollars. 
Erline Aguiluz, Jack Kirby’s Estate Battles Marvel Over Copyright 
Termination, N.Y. ESTATE PLANNING NEWS (Dec. 8, 2010, 8:59 AM), 
http://newyorkestateplanningnews.com/2010/12/jack-kirbys-estate-battles-
marvel-over-copyright-termination.html. 
 13. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c)–(d). 
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terminations. 
Although not as long as ninety-five years, the copyright 
term of a work for hire, an initial grant of rights for thirty-five 
years, seems quite long for corporate publishers. Few 
copyrighted works of a business nature have shelf lives 
measured in decades. Why then, is the longer term obtained 
with work for hire important? The difference between a grant 
of copyright from the author, and an automatic transfer of 
copyright under the work for hire doctrine, might have long-
term consequences. 
For companies that rely on older works as the basis of 
newer works, such as publishers of software, reference works, 
or other works that change incrementally, the ability of authors 
to terminate grants could become very disruptive. Software 
code or sections of updated works would need to be stripped out 
from versions of editions of the work that are published 
following the termination. The consequence of this is not easy 
to predict. Under the Copyright Act, the existing work can be 
utilized but new updates would not be authorized.14 
Treatise author David Nimmer illustrates this consequence 
using motion picture production as the example: 
[A] grant of motion-picture rights in a novel will authorize the 
preparation of a motion picture based upon the novel; even after the 
statutory termination of such a grant, the grantee will continue to 
have the right to “utilize” the film made pursuant thereto. In such 
circumstances, a grantee would not have the right after termination 
to prepare a new motion picture based upon the same novel.15 
By the same logic, a software product may be sold following 
the termination of an assignment or license to use some or all 
of the code in the product. However, new derivative works—
perhaps including even minor updates—may no longer be 
authorized. As a result, there can be significant impacts if a 
work is characterized as an assignment or license of rights 
instead of being a work for hire. 
 14. Id. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A). 
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its 
termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant 
after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the 
preparation after the termination of other derivative works based 
upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant. 
Id. § 203(b)(1) 
 15. 3 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11.02 [C] (2010) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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Where a person creates a wholly-owned business entity, 
such as a personal corporation or LLC, the transfer of rights to 
that entity on a work for hire basis will result in the same 
changes to the author’s rights in the copyrighted work as if the 
work was created as a work for hire for an unrelated employer. 
As a result, the copyright term, the author’s termination rights, 
and moral rights are affected, along with the identity of the 
work’s author. A person who forms a personal corporation may 
wish to include a written agreement between such person and 
the entity, specifying that copyrighted works shall not be 
treated as works for hire.16 This may, however, affect the 
commercial desirability of the entity’s work product to third 
parties. 
II. WHEN IS A WORK MADE FOR HIRE? 
United States copyright law provides two very distinct 
categories of work for hire. The first category regulates 
traditional employment or agency relationships. “A ‘work made 
for hire” is . . . a work prepared by an employee within the 
scope of his or her employment . . . .”17 The second category of 
work for hire deals with specially commissioned works.18 To be 
characterized as a work for hire under this category, the work 
must fall into one or more of the nine statutorily enumerated 
categories and the for-hire relationship must be evidenced by a 
writing signed by both parties.19 The application of the two 
rules does not overlap and each should be analyzed separately. 
 16. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b). 
 17. Id. § 101. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. § 101. The statute defines a “work make for hire” as: 
a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to 
a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as 
an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an 
atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by 
them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the 
purpose of the foregoing sentence, a ‘supplementary work’ is a work 
prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another 
author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, 
explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the 
other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, 
maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer 
material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an 
‘instructional text’ is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for 
publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional 
activities. 
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For a work to be considered a work for hire of an entity, the 
entity must be formed at the time the work is created.20 
A. TRADITIONAL EMPLOYEES UNDER WORK FOR HIRE 
Under a regular employer/employee relationship, the 
copyright in a work vests in the employer when the copyrighted 
work is “prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment.”21 The law of agency applies to determine when a 
person is considered an employee.22 As the Supreme Court 
explained in Committee for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, “[t]o 
determine whether a work is for hire under the Act, a court 
first should ascertain, using principles of general common law 
of agency, whether the work was prepared by an employee or 
an independent contractor. After making this determination, 
the court can apply the appropriate subsection of §101.”23 
The Supreme Court, in Committee for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, provided a non-exclusive list of factors 
determining common law agency in the work for hire context, 
often referred to as the “Reid factors.”24 Interpreting these 
 20. Woods v. Resnick, 725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 825 (W.D. Wis. 2010); see also 
1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 5.03[B] (2010); Billy-Bob Teeth, 
Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 329 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2003) (corporation could not 
establish ownership under work for hire theory because it did not exist when 
author created work). But see Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada Inc., 
617 F.3d 1146, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding harmless error the failure for 
a one-person company to properly distinguish copyright ownership as vesting 
in the company or its owner); Logicom Inclusive, Inc. v. W.P. Stewart & Co., 72 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1632, 1639 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he annulment of Logicom’s 
dissolution in May of 2003 should have retroactive effect, so that Logicom was 
a legal entity capable of authoring and owning copyright of the two computer 
programs at issue.”). 
 21. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 22. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750–51 (1989). 
 23. Id. 
 24. The list of factors considered by the Supreme Court include: 
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the 
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to 
control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. 
Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill 
required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of 
the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; 
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to 
the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when 
and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role 
in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the 
regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in 
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common law agency factors, the Second Circuit has suggested a 
narrower group of factors: 
[T]here are some factors that will be significant in virtually every 
situation. These include: (1) the hiring party’s right to control the 
manner and means of creation; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision 
of employee benefits; (4) the tax treatment of the hired party; and (5) 
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to 
the hired party. These factors will almost always be relevant and 
should be given more weight in the analysis, because they will usually 
be highly probative of the true nature of the employment 
relationship.25 
Similar factors have been applied in determining whether 
an employment relationship exists for other purposes, such as 
whether a sales representative is an employee for purposes of 
bringing a Title VII sexual harassment claim against the hiring 
party26 or whether a medical doctor is an employee of his 
practice group for purposes of taking a tax deduction for a 
malpractice settlement27 
Of the Reid factors, the Second Circuit stated in 1992 that 
employee benefits and tax treatment carried the greatest 
weight.28 This was because these factors were viewed as a 
“virtual admission” by the hiring party as to the nature of the 
relationship and because it would be inequitable to allow an 
employer to treat the hired party as a contractor for benefits 
and payroll taxes purposes while treating him or her as an 
employee for copyright purposes.29 The Eighth Circuit 
reiterated this statement in 1999 in holding that a programmer 
was an independent contractor largely because the hiring party 
failed to extend him employee benefits or pay social security 
taxes, even though other factors pointed to an employment 
business . . . the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment 
of the hired party. . . . No one of these factors is determinative. 
Id. at 751–52 (internal citations omitted). 
 25. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 26. Russell v. BSN Med., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 2d 465, 472 (W.D.N.C. 2010) 
(citing the Reid factors in finding that a sales representative was an employee 
for purposes of a Title VII sexual harassment claim). 
 27. Maimon v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2009-53, 55 (2009). Guidelines for 
determining the existence of employment relationship for tax purposes are 
based on common law definition of an employee. Id. 
 28. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863 (“The importance of these two factors is 
underscored by the fact that every case since Reid that has applied the test 
has found the hired party to be an independent contractor where the hiring 
party failed to extend benefits or pay social security taxes.”). 
 29. Id. 
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relationship.30 
The Second Circuit has since moderated its position with 
respect to Title VII cases, stating that “the ‘greatest emphasis’ 
should be placed on the first factor—that is, on the extent to 
which the hiring party controls the ‘manner and means’ by 
which the worker completes his or her assigned tasks.”31 It is 
too easy for the parties to manipulate workers compensation 
arrangements thereby denying a worker the benefit of the anti-
discrimination laws.32 However, the court, in dicta, noted that 
the “special consideration” accorded to benefits and tax 
treatment may still make sense in the copyright work for hire 
context because the copyright statute allows workers and 
employers to allocate intellectual property rights by contract.33 
A recent traditional application of the Reid work for hire 
factors to software created by a consultant was exemplified by 
Numbers Licensing, LLC v. bVisual USA, Inc.34 The case for 
the programmer, Rance Renfroe, being an independent 
contractor was made easier by the fact that he worked through 
a personal corporation he formed with his wife, Numbers 
Licensing, LLC (Numbers).35 In particular, Renfroe was found 
not an employee of bVisual, a software development company, 
because: (1) Numbers sent bVisual weekly invoices for 
Renfroe’s work; (2) Numbers was responsible for Renfroe’s 
payroll obligations, tax obligations, and employee benefits; (3) 
Numbers supplied much of the equipment used, including 
computers and other standard development tools; (4) although 
one of the two founders of bVisual was heavily involved in some 
aspects of the codes’ creation, he was not capable of detailed 
code review; (5) Renfroe’s services were sought for a specific 
purpose—specialized programming knowledge—and bVisual 
had no right to assign additional projects to Renfroe, as it 
 30. Kirk v. Harter, 188 F.3d 1005, 1008–09 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting other 
factors present including: that the programmer traveled with the company 
president to clients, attended trade shows wearing a company uniform, his 
hours were directed by the company, the parties had a six-year relationship, 
and the programmer spent a significant amount of time working at the 
company’s offices). 
 31. Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc., 237 F.3d 111, 114 
(2d Cir. 2000). 
 32. Id. at 116, 117–118. 
 33. Id. at 117. 
 34. 643 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1252 (E.D. Wash. 2009). 
 35. Id. at 1251. 
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would a regular salaried employee; (6) Renfroe wrote the code 
primarily at Numbers’ offices at his own schedule with 
discretion as to how he performed his work; (7) there were 
instances where Renfroe denied being an employee, for 
example, crossing out “employee” and writing “contractor” on 
his employee handbook; and (8) communications between 
Renfroe and the Company, such as those contained in 
Company’s Confidentiality Agreement Renfroe signed, had a 
“we” vs. “you” mentality.36 
III. TECHNOLOGY STARTUPS 
Where technology startups are concerned, some recent 
decisions have taken a more flexible approach to applying the 
Reid factors to accommodate less traditional arrangements.37 
The tax and benefits treatment of the hired party did not 
control the outcome.38 As a result, whether a copyrighted work 
will be owned by the controlling party has become more 
unpredictable. 
In particular, two recent cases, one which held for the 
employer and the other for the programmer, recognized the 
special circumstances that apply with respect to technology 
startups and software developers.39 The informality with which 
these types of companies typically operate as to record-keeping, 
the creative compensation arrangements utilized by new 
ventures, as well as the fact that programmers can readily 
work remotely with minimal direct oversight from non-
technical management, distinguishes technology startups in 
the work for hire area. 
A. JUSTMED V. BYCE 
In JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, the Ninth Circuit favored the 
employer over the programmer, finding that JustMed owned 
the code at issue as a work for hire, in large measure because it 
was a startup technology company.40 The Ninth Circuit 
 36. Id. at 1251. This factor is somewhat questionable as many standard 
form employee non-disclosure and invention assignment agreements use such 
terminology as a colloquial alternative to legalese like, “party of the first part” 
or “employer” and “employee.” 
 37. See JustMed Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010); Woods 
v. Resnick, 725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 824 (W.D. Wis. 2010). 
 38. JustMed, 600 F.3d at 1128. 
 39. See id.; Woods, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 824. 
 40. JustMed, 600 F.3d at 1126. 
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affirmed the United States District of Idaho’s finding that the 
programmer, Michael Byce, was an employee, not an 
independent contractor of JustMed when he wrote the source 
code for an artificial larynx.41 As a result, the code was covered 
by the work for hire doctrine and JustMed was considered the 
copyright owner.42 
The facts of JustMed evidence a typical startup company 
scenario: Michael Byce and Joel Just were brothers-in-law and 
together they hatched the idea for the product.43 They even got 
a patent as co-inventors for the hands-free aspect of the 
device.44 Byce ceased work on the project for several years after 
his wife died, but Just nonetheless offered Byce stock in 
JustMed and a position on JustMed’s board.45 In the meantime, 
Just hired Jerome Leibler to develop a new hardware prototype 
and write source code.46 When Leibler moved to Kentucky, 
Byce stepped back into the company and took over the 
development of the source code and Leiblers’ compensation 
package.47 Byce worked at home in Idaho (JustMed’s 
headquarters was in Oregon) and discussed the source code 
with Just, but Just never personally edited the code.48 Until 
three months before the dispute, Byce was paid solely in stock, 
but he never actually received any share certificates; they 
accrued in a notebook maintained by Just.49 
Upon becoming aware of the disparity in share ownership 
between himself and Just and Leibler, Byce attempted to 
protect “his” intellectual property.50 He changed the copyright 
notice on the software to reflect his own name, not JustMed’s.51 
Two days before Just was scheduled to meet with a prospective 
merger partner, Byce deleted the code from JustMed’s 
computer, leaving JustMed with only an earlier version, which 
 41. Id. at 1128. 
 42. Id. 
 43. JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, No. CV005-333-S-MHW, 2007 WL 2479887, at 
*2 (D. Idaho Aug. 29, 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at *2–*3. 
 46. Id. at *3. 
 47. Id. at *4. 
 48. Id. at *5. 
 49. Id. at *3, *6. 
 50. Id. at *6. 
 51. Id. at *5. 
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did not run properly.52 JustMed brought state law conversion 
claims, but to prevail, it was required to prove that it owned 
the code.53 In the absence of any written agreement, JustMed’s 
ownership claim rested solely on the application of the work for 
hire doctrine.54 
If Byce was an employee of JustMed, then the preparation 
of the code was within the scope of his employment.55 The 
argument turned on whether Byce was an employee or an 
independent contractor.56 Weighing in favor of Byce being an 
employee were the following factors: 
• The duration of the relationship was 
indefinite/permanent and Byce did not have a 
defined end to his term.57 
• Byce did other work for JustMed besides 
programming. He worked on the company’s 
website, appeared at trade shows, and was a 
director. He had a business card that said “Director 
of Engineering.”58 
• JustMed hired Byce to replace Leibler, an 
employee, and Byce inherited Leibler’s 
compensation arrangements, namely a monthly 
salary paid in stock, so Byce’s arrangements were 
like other JustMed emp
• Byce was paid monthly, not at the completion of his 
specific project.60 
• Byce’s work was integral to JustMed’s primary 
business—the development and marketing of the 
device, which could not work without functioning 
software; the continuous updating of this software 
was too important to be left to an independent 
contractor.61 
Weighing in favor of Byce’s treatment as an independent 
contractor were the following factors: 
 52. Id. at *7. 
 53. Id. at *1. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 56. JustMed, 2007 WL 2479887, at *1. 
 57. JustMed Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 58. JustMed, 2007 WL 2479887, at *5, *9). 
 59. JustMed, 600 F.3d at 1126–27. 
 60. Id. at 1127. 
 61. Id. 
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• Byce was not paid a cash salary or benefits and was 
never provided with actual share certificates.62 
• Until right before the lawsuit, JustMed did not 
treat Byce as an employee for tax purpos
• Byce did not fill out employment forms.
• Byce worked independently with little direct 
supervision from the company.65 
The Court gave the financial factors the short shrift in 
light of JustMed’s status as a startup company and because 
these factors did not bear directly on the substance of the 
employment relationship, namely the right to control.66 Just 
testified that he did not think he had to comply with any 
employment reporting requirements because Byce was an 
“executive” and startup companies tend to pay employees in 
stock which is never reported as income because it has 
uncertain value.67 The court concluded that: 
JustMed’s treatment of Byce with regard to taxes, benefits, and 
employment forms is more likely attributable to the start-up nature of 
the business than to Byce’s alleged status as an independent 
contractor. The indications are that other employees, for example 
Liebler, were treated similarly. Insofar as JustMed did not comply 
with federal and state employment or tax laws, we do not excuse its 
actions, but in this context the remedy for these failings lies not with 
denying the firm its intellectual property but with enforcing the 
relevant laws. 
As a small start-up company, JustMed conducted its business 
more informally than an established enterprise might. This fact can 
make it more difficult to decide whether a hired party is an employee 
or an independent contractor, but it should not make the company 
more susceptible to losing control over software integral to its 
product.68 
The court also dismissed arguments that JustMed’s lack of 
control over the manner and means by which Byce created the 
source code—facts that Reid found most critical69—required a 
finding that Byce was not an employee.70 True, Byce worked at 
 62. JustMed, 2007 WL 2479887, at *3, *6. 
 63. Justmed, 600 F.3d at 1128. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See JustMed, 2007 WL 2479887, at *5. 
 66. JustMed, 600 F.3d at 1128. 
 67. Id. at 1121–22. 
 68. Id. at 1128. 
 69. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750–51 (1989). 
 70. JustMed, 600 F.3d at 1127. 
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home in another state, set his own hours, and had little direct 
supervision from JustMed.71 But the Court noted that these 
factors are not as important to a technology startup as to an 
established company,72 nor are they as relevant in the software 
area. As an “inventive computer programmer,” Byce was 
expected to work independently.73 “The business model and 
Byce’s duties [did] not require that the project be completed in 
a particular manner or that Just continuously oversee Byce’s 
work, so long as JustMed eventually found itself with a 
marketable product.”74 Email and phone input were 
adequate.75 The court concluded: 
The nature of the business and the work [meant] that Byce’s ability to 
set his own hours and [work] from home are not particularly relevant. 
As a programmer, Byce . . . [can] ply his craft at any time and from 
any place without any significant impairment to its quality or his 
ability to meet JustMed’s needs. So although physical separation 
between the hiring party and the [employer] is often relevant to 
determining employment status, it is less germane in light of the kind 
of work Byce was doing.76 
B. WOODS V. RESNICK 
The case of Woods v. Resnick77 followed on the heels of 
JustMed v. Byce, but came out the opposite way, favoring the 
programmer on somewhat similar facts.78 Adam Resnick and 
Erick Woods were equal partners in F&I Source LLC, a 
software company that developed, maintained, and licensed a 
web-based software program used in the auto finance 
industry.79 After examining the work for hire factors, the court 
held that Woods, the partner who wrote the code, was not an 
employee of F&I Source.80  Thus, the absence of a signed 
agreement from Woods assigning the copyright to Resnick or to 
the company, along with a determination that joint ownership 
 71. Id. at 1122. 
 72. Id. at 1127. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. In this regard, the Court noted that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY § 220, cmt. e, (1958), explains that “[t]he custom of the community 
as to the control ordinarily exercised in a particular occupation is of 
importance.” Id. at 1127 n.7. 
 75. Id. at 1127. 
 76. Id. at 1127–28. 
 77. Woods v. Resnick, 725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 809 (W.D. Wis. 2010). 
 78. Id. at 813–16. 
 79. Id. at 812. 
 80. Id. at 824. 
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was not proven, prompted the court to hold that Woods was the 
program’s sole author.81 
The facts that led the court to find that Woods was not an 
employee of F&I Source were as follows: (1) Resnick, a finance 
director for various car dealerships, came up with an idea for a 
customizable auto finance program;82 (2) he developed a 
working prototype consisting of spreadsheets, diagrams, and 
notes, but did not have programming expertise;83 (3) 
accordingly, the source code for the program was produced 
primarily, if not exclusively, by Woods, Resnick’s high school 
friend;84 (4) Woods worked full-time out of his home on his own 
computer, borrowing some portions of the code from a project 
he had worked on previously;85 (5) Woods set his own hours 
and worked independently without oversight from Resnick, 
although the two would often exchange “task lists                  
and . . . emails identifying things that needed to be done to the 
system”;86 (6) Woods received a monthly draw against future 
distributions of profits pursuant to a K-1 tax statement;87       
(7) other employees of F&I Source, handling sales and 
marketing, received wages and W-2 statements from the 
company;88 (8) Woods’ home address was listed as the 
company’s principal place of business.89 
Woods had conceded he was not an independent contractor, 
leading Resnick to argue that he must be an employee.90 Woods 
countered that he was neither an independent contractor nor 
an employee; rather he was “a 50% owner and member of F&I 
Source, LLC.”91 
The District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin 
adopted Wood’s position.92 As a co-owner of the company, the 
Court stated that Woods did not have an agency relationship 
 81. Id. at 826. 
 82. Id. at 813. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 815. 
 85. Id. at 814. 
 86. Id. at 815. 
 87. Id. at 814. 
 88. See id.  
 89. Id. at 815. 
 90. Id. at 824. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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with the company.93 The Court reasoned further, “[u]nlike an 
employee or independent contractor, an owner has an inherent 
right to control the business. ‘[T]he attribute of co-ownership 
distinguishes a partnership from a mere agency      
relationship. . . . Ownership involves the power of ultimate 
control.’”94 
From this foundation of mutual ownership and control by 
the co-owners, the Court inferred that F&I Source did not meet 
the control factors required by Reid: 
As equal partners in the LLC, Woods and Resnick have equal voting 
rights. There is no operating agreement or deadlock-breaking 
agreement. As a result, unless both of them agree to a particular 
action, deadlock ensues. In other words, the company does not have 
the ability to compel either owner to take action. Under this scenario, 
there is no basis for finding that Woods was an employee under the 
control of F&I Source.95 
Of course, the rationale of co-ownership would have been less 
compelling had the author owned less than fifty percent of the 
hiring party’s equity. 
Also supporting the Court’s conclusion that Woods’ code 
was not a work for hire was the fact that the LLC asserting 
ownership was not formed until after Woods had written the 
program and assembled a product that was ready for 
distribution to the public.96 The Court dismissed pre-formation 
activities as nothing “more than a working trade name that the 
parties were using while they developed their project.”97 
Resnick failed to contend there had existed a general 
partnership prior to the formation of the LLC, despite the 
ongoing activities between the two parties.98 Given the Court’s 
view of the Reid control factors, favoring Woods, a 
determination that the entity had existed as a general 
partnership would likely have had little effect on the outcome, 
 93. Id. But see WIS. STAT. § 183.0301(1)(a) (2009) (“Each member is an 
agent of the limited liability company, but not of the other members or any of 
them, for the purpose of its business.”). The applicable Wisconsin statute 
stands at odds with the assertion of the Court. At the partnership stage, the 
result is the same. See WIS. STAT. § 178.06 (1) (2009) (“Every partner is an 
agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business . . . .”). 
 94. Woods, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 824 (quoting REVISED UNIFORM 
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 202(a), cmt. (1997)). 
 95. Id. (citation omitted). 
 96. Id. at 825. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. See WIS. STAT. § 178.03 (1) (2009) (“A partnership is an association 
of 2 or more persons to carry on as co−owners [sic] a business for profit.”). 
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but it would have at least precluded an independent basis for 
denying work for hire ownership.99 
Moreover, the outcome would likely have been the same 
even if the Court had not focused on the novel basis of company 
co-ownership: Woods received no benefits, his compensation 
came from company profits, and Woods worked out of his 
house.100 Almost every Reid factor weighed in Woods’ favor. 
The Court, however, felt compelled to acknowledge the 
recent Ninth Circuit decision in JustMed v Byce. It admitted 
that the JustMed case stands for the proposition that “some of 
the Reid factors tending to show that a party is an independent 
contractor—such as the hiring party’s lack of day-to-day 
oversight over the other party and failure to pay employment 
benefits—have less weight given how technology start-ups 
operate.”101 Nevertheless, the Court distinguished JustMed on 
its facts: in JustMed there was a corporation, not an LLC with 
two equal members, and Byce was “hired” by JustMed to 
replace an employee and was paid the same salary as that 
employee.102 
While the Woods decision emphasizes the control factors 
inherent in the jointly-owned LLC, the differing outcomes in 
JustMed and Woods may also be explained by reference to the 
equities. In JustMed, Byce attempted to derail the sale of the 
company and extract leverage with respect to his stock 
ownership by altering the copyright notice and deleting the 
code.103 The case arose as a conversion claim.104 In addition, 
the district court found that Byce was not a “credible witness” 
concerning his compensation.105 By contrast, in Woods the 
copyright notice always said “Erick Woods,” the parties were 
seeking a declaratory judgment, and Resnick’s testimony that 
he wrote some of the code was called into question.106 
 99. Cf. Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada Inc., 617 F.3d 1146, 
1156–57 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding harmless error the failure for a one-person 
company to properly distinguish copyright ownership as vesting in the 
company or its owner). 
 100. Woods 725 F. Supp. 2d at 814–15. 
 101. Id. at 824. 
 102. Id.at 824–25 (citations omitted). 
 103. JustMed Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 104. Id. at 1123. 
 105. Id. at 1127. 
 106. Woods 725 F. Supp. 2d. at 812, 813, 815. 
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IV. INTERPRETING WORK FOR HIRE CLAUSES 
Even where an employment relationship is unquestionable, 
copyright law and the work for hire doctrine can create 
ambiguity as to the vesting of copyrights in new materials. 
Thus, a written agreement may be used with employees to 
clarify what work is to be vested in the employer as a work for 
hire and what work is to be retained by the employee.107 The 
parties can agree whether a relationship is an employment 
relationship or modify the work for hire provision’s 
requirement that a particular work is within the scope of 
employment.108 Yet, even a work prepared by an employee will 
not be regarded as a work for hire if it is not prepared in the 
“scope of employment.”109 “Therefore, an agreement between an 
employer and employee whereby works prepared by the 
employee that are not prepared within the scope of employment 
are nevertheless deemed to be ‘works made for hire,’ will not in 
itself, convert such works into the ‘for hire’ category.”110 
 107. See id. at 813 (describing such an agreement). 
 108. Arguably two parties cannot claim an employment relationship where 
the common law agency factors clearly demonstrate that no such relationship 
would exist. This was the reason the music industry attempted to include 
sound recordings under the category of specially commissioned works, an 
amendment which was once incorporated as a technical correction to the 
Copyright Act, but then retroactively withdrawn. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
In determining whether any work is eligible to be considered a work 
made for hire under paragraph (2), neither the amendment contained 
in section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications 
Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of 
Public Law 106-113, nor the deletion of the words added by that 
amendment— 
(A) shall be considered or otherwise given any legal significance, or 
(B) shall be interpreted to indicate congressional approval or 
disapproval of, or acquiescence in, any judicial determination, 
by the courts or the Copyright Office. Paragraph (2) shall be 
interpreted as if both section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made For Hire and 
Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 and section 1011(d) of the 
Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 
1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, were 
never enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness by 
the Congress at any time of any judicial determinations. 
Id. So a copyright assignment clause which states that “the parties hereby 
recognize that Author hereunder is an employee for purposes of copyright but 
for no other purpose (including inter alia, tax and labor laws) . . .” would likely 
be disregarded by the fact-finder if the remaining Reid factors dictated an 
independent contractor relationship. To do otherwise would circumvent the 
limitations on specially commissioned works embodied in the Copyright Act. 
 109. 5 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 5.03[B][1][b][ii] (2010). 
 110. Id. 
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A. MATTEL INC. V. MGA ENTERTAINMENT, INC. 
In the case of an express employment agreement, 
uncertainty can exist based on the interpretation of the 
contractual terms. In Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 
the Ninth Circuit addressed the impact of a written 
employment agreement used to augment the work for hire 
doctrine.111 The appeal focused on the written agreement 
between a Mattel employee, Carter Bryant, and Mattel.112 
“Bryant worked in the ‘Barbie Collectibles’ department [of 
Mattel], where he designed fashion and hair styles for high-end 
Barbie dolls intended more for accumulation than for play.”113  
During the time period that Bryant was employed at Mattel, he 
created sketches, a crude mock-up, and had the ideas for 
several doll names, all of which he pitched to Mattel’s 
competitor, MGA.114 Bryant subsequently left Mattel for a 
consulting arrangement with MGA to work on the development 
of the Bratz line.115 A flurry of lawsuits by Mattel followed, 
asserting that it was the owner of the intellectual property 
rights in the Bratz dolls, including the doll names.116 
Bryant’s employment contract included the following 
somewhat standard language: 
I agree to communicate to the Company as promptly and fully as 
practicable all inventions (as defined below) conceived or reduced to 
practice by me (alone or jointly by others) at any time during my 
employment by the Company. I hereby assign to the Company . . . all 
my right, title and interest in such inventions, and all my right, title 
and interest in any patents, copyrights, patent applications or 
copyright applications based thereon.117 
The contract further specified that, “the term ‘inventions’ 
includes, but is not limited to, all discoveries, improvements, 
processes, developments, designs, know-how, data computer 
programs and formulae, whether patentable or 
unpatentable.”118 
 111. Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 912 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 112. Id. at 910. 
 113. Id. at 907. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 910. 
 117. Id. at 909 (emphasis omitted). 
 118. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The language of Bryant’s employment contract did not 
expressly cover “ideas.”119 It did, however, apply to inventions 
“conceived as well as those reduced to practice,” suggesting that 
the assignment governed works that were not yet fixed.120 The 
District Court for the Central District of California found the 
provisions of Bryant’s employment contract covered ideas such 
as those involving the doll names “Bratz” and “Jade” as a 
matter of law.121 The Ninth Circuit held that this finding 
should have been submitted to the jury based on extrinsic 
evidence, including reference to other Mattel employee 
contracts that included “ideas,” and the common perceptions in 
the design industry.122 
Yet, even if Bryant’s employment contract covered his 
ideas, other contractual interpretation issues remained. The 
agreement specified that all inventions conceived or reduced to 
practice “at any time during my employment” were assigned to 
Mattel.123 The sketches and sculpt clearly qualified as 
“inventions”.124 However, the employment contract did not 
clarify whether “during my employment” was limited to 
Bryant’s actual working hours or covered the entire period or 
term of his employment.125 In addition, the employment 
contract expressly excepted inventions that qualify under the 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Such works could include 
“know-how” and “discoveries.” 
 121. Id. at 909. 
 122. Id. at 910. 
At various stages of litigation, the parties introduced such evidence 
supporting their respective interpretations of ‘inventions.’ Contracts 
Mattel drafted for other employees, for example, expressly assigned 
their ‘ideas’’ as well as their ‘inventions.’ This tends to show that the 
term ‘inventions’ alone doesn’t include ideas. On the other hand, a 
Mattel executive claimed during her deposition that it was common 
knowledge in the design industry that terms like ‘invention’ and 
‘design’ did include employee ideas. Because the district court 
concluded that the language of the contract was clear, it didn’t 
consider the extrinsic evidence the parties presented. Even if it had, it 
may not have been able to resolve the meaning of ‘inventions.’ If the 
meaning turns in part on the credibility of conflicting extrinsic 
evidence, a properly instructed jury should have decided the issue. 
Id. 
 123. Id. at 909. 
 124. Id. at 911. 
 125. See id. at 913 (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate 
because there was ample reasoning to read the agreement as covering and not 
covering non-working hours). 
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provisions of the California Labor Code section 2870.126 This 
section limits the extent to which an employer can use an 
employment agreement to assign inventions that may be 
outside the scope of employment: 
(a) Any provision in an employment agreement which provides that 
an employee shall assign, or offer to assign, any of his or her rights in 
an invention to his or her employer shall not apply to an invention 
that the employee developed entirely on his or her own time without 
using the employer’s equipment, supplies, facilities, or trade secret 
information except for those inventions that either: 
(1) Relate at the time of conception or reduction to practice of the 
invention to the employer’s business, or actual or demonstrably 
anticipated research or development of the employer; or 
(2) Result from any work performed by the employee for the 
employer.127 
The two exceptions in section 2870 reasonably approximate the 
“scope of employment” prong of the work for hire doctrine, as 
applied to the state law of assignment of employee work 
product.128 
The Ninth Circuit found that the evidence conflicted as to 
the interpretation of the phrase “at any time during my 
employment.”129 One Mattel employee testified that 
“everything I did while at the company belonged to [it],” while 
another employee testified that “it was common knowledge that 
a lot of people . . . moonlight[ed] . . . which wasn’t a problem if it 
was on their own time, and at their own house.”130 The Ninth 
Circuit held that the issue (as to whether Bryant’s contract 
covered his work on Bratz) should have been submitted to the 
jury under instructions to “determine (1) whether Bryant’s 
 126. Id. at 912 n.5. 
 127. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2870 (a) (West 2010). 
 128. Id. The Section concludes by stating, “(b) To the extent a provision in 
an employment agreement purports to require an employee to assign an 
invention otherwise excluded from being required to be assigned under 
subdivision (a), the provision is against the public policy of this state and is 
unenforceable.” Id. Other states with similar statues limiting the scope of 
employee invention assignment agreements are Delaware (DEL CODE ANN. 
LABOR 19, § 805 (West 2011)); Illinois (765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1060/2 
(WEST 2011)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-130 (West 2010)); Minnesota 
(MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.78 (West 2010)); North Carolina (N. C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 66-57.1 (West 2010)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-39-3 (West 2010)); 
and Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.140 (West 2010)), among 
others. 
 129. Mattel, 616 F.3d at 912 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 130. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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agreement assigned works created outside the scope of his 
employment at Mattel, and (2) whether Bryant’s creation of the 
Bratz sketches and sculpt was outside the scope of his 
employment.”131 
Mattel also argued that the juxtaposition of the 
employment agreement and the work for hire doctrine argued 
in favor of a broad interpretation of the agreement. Under the 
Copyright Act, employers are the authors of works made for 
hire under; as such, “the agreement must cover works made 
outside the scope of employment.”132 If this were not the case 
employees would be assigning to their employer works, which 
the employer already owned.133 The court dismissed this 
argument on the grounds that the contract provided Mattel 
additional rights by covering more than just copyrightable 
works and the contract could “also be enforced in state court, 
whereas Copyright Act claims must be heard in federal 
court.”134 
The portion of Bryant’s contract quoted by the Ninth 
Circuit did not specify Bryant’s employment obligations or his 
duties. Nothing in the facts suggested that Bryant was 
employed to develop new dolls to compete with or complement 
Barbie Dolls or other Mattel products.135 If Bryant’s 
employment contract had provided that all doll and toy designs 
were part of his duties for Mattel, then the determination 
might have been in Mattel’s favor.136 Likewise, had the 
 131. Id. at 913. To the extent a contract specifically includes all ideas that 
are reduced to practice or otherwise fixed during the time of employment, they 
are within the California Labor Code exception for works that “[r]elate at the 
time of conception or reduction to practice of the invention to the employer’s 
business, or actual or demonstrably anticipated research or development of 
the employer.”  
132 Id. at 912 n.7. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Evidence supports the MGA contention that it investigated the right 
of Bryant to develop Bratz and concluded the materials were created outside 
the scope of Bryant’s employment at Mattel. See Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, 
Inc., No. CV 04-9049, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102461, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 
22, 2010) (MGA’s attorney emailed Carter’s attorney asking “specifically about 
the Mattel issue and she said she reviewed the chronology of the creation of 
this design and is satisfied that Carter created it outside the scope of his 
employment at Mattel.”). 
 136. The Ninth Circuit states that, on remand, Mattel might well convince 
a properly instructed jury that Bryant’s preliminary Bratz sketches and sculpt 
were created within the scope of his employment at Mattel. Mattel, Inc. v. 
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contract between Mattel and Bryant specified that any new 
products involving dolls or toys were developed for the benefit 
of Mattel, then any ambiguity might also have been resolved.137 
The nature of the Bratz dispute reinforces the need to 
clarify the scope of an employee’s responsibility. In many large 
corporations however, most employee work for hire invention 
assignment agreements are standard forms that are not 
tailored to any particular employee’s job duties.138 To 
determine whether an employee’s work is produced in the scope 
of employment, the court may look at the employee’s job 
description.139 Such a description can be more influential as to 
the scope of employment than whether the work was created 
during working hours or on the employer’s premises. 
In Marshall v. Miles Laboratories,  John Marshall, a staff 
scientist for Miles Laboratories (Miles), was held to have 
authored a research paper within the scope of his employment 
because his job description as “Director of Enzyme Research 
and Development” was to “develop, summarize and report 
information about advances in technologies of interest” and 
maintain an awareness of the latest scientific advances in his 
specialty.140 
Marshall claimed that the research paper was not made 
within the scope of his employment and therefore, Miles did not 
hold the copyright. Marshall testified that “his contributions to 
MGA Entm’t, Inc., Nos. 09-5673, 09-55812, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24150, at 
*19 (9th Cir. Oct. 21, 2010.) 
 137. On remand, the jury reached a verdict largely favoring MGA. The jury 
held, among other things, that Mattel did not prove that it owned the name or 
the concept for the Bratz line of dolls. See Mattel Stole MGA's Bratz Trade 
Secrets, Jury Says, LAW 360 (April 21, 2011), 
http://www.law360.com/topnews/articles/240538/mattel-stole-mga-s-bratz-
trade-secrets-jury-says. 
 138. See, e.g., Work-For-Hire Agreement, CREATIVE BUS. SOLUTIONS, 
http://www.creativebusiness.com/pdf_free/CBworkforhire.pdf (last visited Apr. 
4, 2011). 
 139. Marshall v. Miles Labs, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (N.D. Ind. 1986) 
(demonstrating a court looking to an employee’s job description to determine 
whether his actions were within the scope of his employment). 
 140. Id. at 1327, 1330 (citations omitted). Marshall had the following 
language in his employment contract: “All discoveries or inventions, whether 
patentable or not, conceived jointly or solely by the EMPLOYEE during the 
period of employment shall become the property of the COMPANY without 
additional compensation or consideration.” Id. at 1330 n.2. Because the 
contract was allegedly signed by Marshall under duress, the court did not give 
it weight when determining the outcome of the case. Id. 
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the article were not prepared while he was at his office at 
Miles, that Miles never specifically instructed him to write the 
article, and he was never given additional consideration for the 
article.”141 The U.S. District Court for the District of Indiana 
rejected Marshall’s assertions, finding: 
Neither case law nor the legislative history suggests that a person can 
avoid the ‘work made for hire’ doctrine merely by preparing the work 
during non-working hours or in a facility not controlled by the 
employer. The mere fact that preparations were done outside an 
employee’s office or normal working hours does not remove such 
preparations from the scope of employment.142 
Since the article otherwise qualified as within the scope of 
Marshall’s employment, it was deemed a work for hire of 
Miles.143 
In sum, being an employee does not transfer to the 
employer every copyrighted work developed. Only those works 
reasonably related to the scope of the employment will vest in 
the employer. If the copyrighted materials reflect the type of 
work typical for that employee, then the work for hire doctrine 
can extend to those works without regard to whether the actual 
fixation occurred at home or in the office. 
V. SPECIALLY COMMISSIONED WORKS 
The second category of works made for hire applies to 
specifically commissioned  works. For these works, the status of 
the employee is not relevant. Instead, the work must fall into 
one of nine categories enumerated under the Copyright Act, 
and must be transferred to the hiring party in a writing signed 
by both the person commissioning the work and by the person 
who prepared the work pursuant to said commission.144 If both 
requirements are met, the copyright vests in the hiring party 
as the author.145 
The nine categories of work that are eligible to be specially 
commissioned works are works used “as a contribution to a 
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, 
 141. Id. at 1330. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1331; see also 1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
5.03[B][1][b][i] (2010). 
 144. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 145. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE UNDER THE 1976 
COPYRIGHT ACT (2010). 
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as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer 
material for a test, or as an atlas.”146 
Motion pictures are a prime example, demonstrating the 
need for extending the work for hire doctrine to specially 
commissioned works because the screenwriter, director, set 
designer, cinematographer, and even the actors are not 
generally employees, but might be contributing copyrighted 
material to the final product. Motion picture companies 
typically hire parties using written contracts that specify that 
the work is done as a specially commissioned work; as a result, 
the copyright in all elements of the movie vests exclusively in 
the company.147 
Similar logistical demands apply to software development 
and the creation of sophisticated videogames and online 
content. Software has been argued to be within the nine 
categories of specially commissioned works either as a part of 
 146. 17 U.S.C. § 101. To better understand the nine categories of specially 
commissioned works, the statute definitions provide additional information, 
for example: 
“Audiovisual works” are works that consist of a series of related 
images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of 
machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic 
equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of 
the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the 
works are embodied. . . . 
  A “collective work” is a work, such as a periodical issue, 
anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, 
constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are 
assembled into a collective whole. . . . 
A “compilation” is a work formed by the collection and assembling of 
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or 
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes 
an original work of authorship. The term “compilation” includes 
collective works. . . . 
   [A] ‘supplementary work’ is a work prepared for a publication as a 
secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of 
introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, 
commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as 
forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, 
editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, 
bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes; and an “instructional text” is 
a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with 
the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. . . . 
Id. 
 147. See Joseph J. Beard, Clones, Bones and Twilight Zones: Protecting the 
Digital Personal of the Quick, the Dead and the Imaginary, 16 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1165, 1175–77 (2001). 
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collective work in the system as a whole148 or because the non-
literal elements of the program constitute a compilation.149 
Not just any writing will qualify as sufficient to make a 
specially-commissioned work a work for hire. In some decisions, 
a work for hire agreement providing that a work is a specially 
commissioned work must expressly include the terms “work-
for-hire” or “specially commissioned work.”150 Without these 
express terms, the contract may not be more than an 
assignment of copyright.151 In other decisions, “talismanic 
words” are not required so long as the intent of the parties to 
enter into a work for hire relationship is sufficiently expressed 
in the written agreement.152 Thus, it is always preferable to 
use these terms if they appropriately express the intent of the 
parties. Even an assignment of “all right, title and interest” 
does not intuitively suggest that more than an assignment of 
the copyright is intended.153 In Numbers Licensing, LLC v. 
bVisual USA, Inc., a copyright notice embedded in the source 
code that said “Numbers Consulting for bVisual, copyright,” 
was not sufficient to constitute a written agreement that the 
program was a work for hire.154 The Court held this to be 
inconsistent with Congressional intent to have certainty in 
copyright ownership at the outset and, further, that the code 
entries lacked the parties’ signatures.155 
A. LOGICOM INCLUSIVE, INC. V. W.P. STEWART & CO. 
The case of Logicom Inclusive, Inc. v. W.P. Stewart & Co. 
provides a veritable checklist of what to do in the context of 
specially-commissioned software, namely: (1) make sure that 
contractors working for another contractor create works for 
hire for their employer; (2) make sure that a written 
 148. Numbers Licensing, LLC v. bVisual USA, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 
1253 (E.D. Wash. 2009). 
 149. Logicom Inclusive v. W.P. Stewart & Co., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1632, 1640 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 150. Id. at 1641 (citing Armento v. Laser Image, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 719, 730 
(W.D.N.C. 1996) (“The Second Circuit has indicated that the omission [of the 
words ‘work for hire’] is fatal.”)). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1641. 
 153. Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 560 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(“[assignment] of all right, title and interest” was not sufficient to evidence a 
work for hire relationship). 
 154. Numbers, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 1252. 
 155. Id. 
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instrument mentions “specially-commissioned works” and/or 
“work for hire;” (3) make sure that the entity claiming to be the 
author of the copyrighted work is in good standing when the 
work is created; and (4) a copyright registration only affords a 
presumption of validity if it is timely filed. 156 
The defendant in Logicom, W.P. Stewart & Co. (WPS), was 
a global investment advisor and financial services firm that 
hired Logicom in 1985 to create software for a number of 
programs involving the core financial services of WPS.157 
Logicom created the two copyrighted works at issue in 1995.158 
Relations deteriorated over attempts to enter into a written 
agreement and, in early 2003, Logicom’s ongoing services were 
terminated.159 WPS continued to modify the software using its 
own employees and independent contractors.160 Logicom sued 
for copyright infringement for the unauthorized creation of 
derivative works.161 
The defense by WPS raised a number of critical points. 
First, WPS challenged Logicom’s ownership of the software 
created by WPS’s own independent contractors.162 To prevail, 
the court had to first determine that the software was covered 
under the statutory definition of a specially commissioned 
work.163 As the Logicom Court recognized, “[c]omputer 
program” is not expressly listed as one of the nine categories of 
specially commissioned works under § 101 of the Copyright 
Act.164 “However, the case law makes clear that the nonliteral 
elements of a computer program are properly considered a 
‘compilation’ insofar as the concepts of selection, arrangement 
and organization, central to the compilation doctrine, are 
included in the analysis of a computer program’s structure.”165 
As a result, the creation of software is within the nine 
 156. See 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1632, 1632 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 157. Id. at 1634–35. 
 158. Id. at 1635. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.at 1636. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1639. 
 163. Id. at 1640. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. (citing Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 
711–12 (2d Cir. 1992); Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 
1042, 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
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enumerated categories of works that may be specially 
commissioned. 
Secondly, for the work to be considered a work for hire, 
“the parties [must] expressly agree in a written instrument 
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made 
for hire.”166 The contract signed by the parties in Logicom 
stated that “[w]ork [p]roduct created by [c]onsultant . . . shall 
be the sole property of Company for the sole use of the 
Company and its clients.”167 Rather than following this narrow 
interpretation, in Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Dumas,168 the 
judge followed the Ninth Circuit precedent to find the 
contractual language was sufficient.169 This was a generous 
reading in favor of the hiring party, as courts may be reluctant 
to find work for hire when the plaintiff is an independent 
contractor claiming not to have agreed to be stripped of 
statutory copyright protections through vague or ambiguous 
language. Therefore, although the Logicom court found for 
WPS, it also serves as a warning regarding the need to use 
statutory terms in the specially commissioned agreement. 
A third warning also flows from Logicom regarding the 
registration of copyright for startups utilizing software and 
similar works. A valid copyright registration is a prerequisite to 
litigation of a copyright infringement claim by a U.S. author.170 
Without at least an application pending for registration, there 
can be no copyright action.171 
The defendant claimed the copyright registration was not 
valid because the employer firm was not in existence at the 
time of registration or the filing of the suit.172 Logicom had 
 166. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 167. Logicom Inclusive, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1641 (5th alteration in original) 
(citation omitted). 
 168. 53 F.3d 549, 565 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 169. Logicom, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1642 (citing Warren v. Fox Family 
Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]here is no 
requirement, either in the [Copyright] Act or the caselaw, that work-for-hire 
contracts include any specific wording.”)); See generally Playboy, 53 F.3d at 
551–65. 
 170. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006) (“[N]o action for infringement of the 
copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration 
or registration of the copyright claim has been made. . . .”). 
 171. If the alleged copyright owner meets the notice, deposit and 
registration application process, then the suit can proceed even if the 
copyright office refuses to register the work. See 2 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 7.18 (2010). 
 172. Logicom, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1638. 
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been lawfully formed in 1990, but allowed its corporate status 
to lapse in 1994.173 Defendants claimed that “because the 
corporation had been dissolved, Logicom could not have been 
the proper ‘author’ of the two computer programs [written in 
1995], as is attested in the certificates of registration [issued in 
2002].”174 In 2003, Logicom annulled the dissolution, returning 
to good standing as a New York corporation.175 The Logicom 
court relied on the good faith but mistaken belief that a viable 
corporation existed and the annulment of the dissolution—
rather than the formation of another entity—to find the 
copyright registration was valid.176 
It is quite common for startup businesses to begin 
operating before their organizational formalities are completed; 
even so, the Copyright Act is not generally forgiving to 
inaccurate registrations. Section 411(b)(b)(1) provides: 
A certificate of registration satisfies the requirements of this section 
and section 412, regardless of whether the certificate contains any 
inaccurate information, unless— 
(A) the inaccurate information was included on the application for 
copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate; and 
(B) the inaccuracy of the information, if known, would have caused 
the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration.177 
As to prong (A), the applicant’s good faith belief that Logicom 
continued to operate protected the registration.178 
Nevertheless, Logicom’s copyright application should have been 
invalid under prong (B) because the Copyright Office will 
typically refuse registration when the application is made by an 
unauthorized applicant. By accepting the good faith assertion 
regarding the corporate status, the Logicom court saved the 
copyright.179 The inaccuracy caused by registering the 
copyright in a non-existent corporation was not fatal in this 
case, but it certainly has the potential to undermine the 
validity of the registration or the authority of the entity to 
enter into the work for hire agreement.180 
 173. Id. at 1636. 
 174. Id. at 1638. 
 175. Id. at 1635. 
 176. Id. at 1638–39. 
 177. 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) (2006). 
 178. Logicom, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1638–39. 
 179. Id. at 1639. 
 180. The more likely rationale was that during the period when Logicom 
was operating without recognition as a lawful corporation, it was in fact a 
 2011] WORK FOR HIRE 517 
                                                          
Finally, the Logicom decision grappled with the validity of 
the copyright registration itself. The registration was filed 
December 20, 2002 for a work listed as being created in 
1995.181 A copyright registration made before or within five 
years after the first publication of a work is prima facie 
evidence of the validity of the copyright and the facts stated in 
the related Certificate of Registration.182 Since the work in this 
case was a custom software package installed for the benefit of 
WPS and sold to no other parties, the court correctly 
determined the software was unpublished. Courts have not 
provided much guidance regarding the presumption that 
should be afforded to information contained in copyright 
registration certificates with respect to unpublished works. 
Looking to the language of the statute, courts generally find 
that the copyright is “presumptively valid” by implication 
because the work is unpublished.183 
The Logicom court relied on a different interpretation of 
the statute to provide the presumption of validity to the 
certificate of registration. It held that “[t]he statute requires 
that a court begin its countdown five years after first 
publication of a copyrightable work.”184 This is an alternative 
reading of the language “before or within five years after first 
publication of the work.”185 The Logicom interpretation 
suggests that the presumption is available only if the work is 
registered within five years after its publication and essentially 
ignores the word “before.” Factually, the registration for the 
unpublished work was seven years after its creation, therefore,  
no presumption of validity was available.186 While this is likely 
the wrong result, a court’s interpretation of the Copyright Act 
general partnership. As a general partnership, it would have continued to 
have the authority to enter into the work for hire agreement and register the 
copyright. 
 181. Logicom, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1637. 
 182. 17 U.S.C. § 410 (c). 
In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or 
within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie 
evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the 
certificate. The evidentiary weight to be accorded the certificate of a 
registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of the court. 
 Id. (emphasis added). 
 183. See, e.g., Infodek, Inc. v. Meredith-Webb Printing Co., 830 F. Supp. 
614, 621 (N.D. Ga. 1993). 
 184. Logicom, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1638 (emphasis added). 
 185. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). 
 186. Logicom, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1638. 
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can sometimes be unpredictable. 
What makes this result more understandable in the 
context of Logicom are the changes that occurred in the 
computer programs during the seven years between their first 
creation and their alleged infringement. As testified, the work 
was subject to “major overhauls.”187 As a result, the registered 
work may not have borne any reasonable resemblance to the 
work that was infringed. A registration should be sufficient to 
protect an infringement of a derivative work, except when only 
the newly added material is infringed. In those cases, the 
original registration will not provide a basis for the copyright 
infringement claim because it does not cover the revisions at 
issue.188 
In sum, when addressing the categories of work available 
for specially-commissioned status, the language in the work for 
hire agreement, the ownership of copyright by a dissolved 
corporation, and the effect of delay in obtaining registration, 
the Logicom dispute provides a roadmap for avoiding the 
contractual pitfalls of work for hire in the case of specially 
commissioned works. 
VI. NON-APPLICABILITY OF WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE 
A. BACK-UP ASSIGNMENT OF COPYRIGHT 
While reliance on the work for hire doctrine is a critical 
part of planning for United States companies, this doctrine is 
not recognized in Europe and many other jurisdictions.189 
Moreover, there is ambiguity as to the works that fall within 
the nine types of works that can be specially-commissioned 
under the work for hire doctrine, whether the creator is an 
employee, and whether the work was created in the scope of 
employment. As a result, companies would be well advised to 
include saving language in their work for hire agreements, 
specifying that the copyright in any work that is not recognized 
under the law as a work for hire is treated by the parties as 
assigned to the employer. An example of such a saving clause 
 187. Id. at 1637. 
 188. See H. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976). 
 189. The conflicts of law issues can become quite complex when the 
employee is located in a foreign jurisdiction that does not recognize the work 
for hire doctrine. See 1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 5.03[B][1][c] 
(2010). 
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is: “to the extent the work created by contractor/employee in 
the scope of any [engagement/employment] is not recognized as 
a work for hire as a matter of law, the contractor/employee 
hereby assigns any and all copyright in such works to 
employer.” Such an assignment provision will serve to transfer 
ownership to the employer, “but will not trigger the other legal 
benefits to the employer that flow from the status of a ‘for-hire’ 
work.”190 
A written transfer of copyright must meet the 
requirements of the Copyright Act.191 It must be “an 
instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the 
transfer . . . in writing and signed by the owner of the rights 
conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.”192 “To be 
valid [as] an assignment under §204(a) [of the Copyright Act, 
an assignment] must ‘clearly identify the deal and its basic 
parameters.’”193 In Playboy Enterprises v. Dumas, the Second 
Circuit refused to consider as an assignment of copyright a 
legend on the back of a check on which payee assigned “all 
right title and interest” in the described painting because it did 
not mention the word “copyright” and evidence was conflicted 
as to whether the parties intended to transfer the copyright or 
only a one-time reproduction right.194 
Copyright assignment requirements are not satisfied by 
contracts with third parties.195 Recently, in Woods v. Resnick, a 
court pointed out that it was not sufficient to assign a copyright 
that Woods, the author of the code, signed (on behalf of F&I 
Source) a service agreement with a third party that reserved 
rights in the code to F&I Source.196 Nor was it sufficient that 
the terms and conditions on F&I Source’s website, also drafted 
by Woods, stated that F&I Source was the sole and exclusive 
owner of the copyrights on the website.197 While these were 
“circumstantial admissions,” they did not satisfy the statutory 
requirements for the assignment of copyright from Woods to 
 190. Id. § 5.03[B][1][b][ii]. 
 191. 17 U.S.C. §204(a) (2006). 
 192. Id.  
 193. Woods v. Resnick, 725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 826 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (citing 
Weinstein Co. v. Smokewood Entm’t Grp., 664 F. Supp. 2d 332, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009)). 
 194. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 564 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 195. See, e.g., Woods, 725 F. Supp. at 826. 
 196. Id. at 825–26. 
 197. Id. at 826. 
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F&I Source.198 “Instead, the documents confirm[ed] the rights 
that exist between F&I Source and third parties.”199 Said the 
court: “[T]he written documents are not between Woods and 
F&I Source and they do not contain any terms clearly 
identifying the terms of any transfer deal between the two.”200 
The purpose of the signed writing requirement is “to 
ensure that the copyright owner deliberately transfers its 
ownership interest and that the owner does so in way that 
provides the parties with a clear guide to their rights and 
responsibilities.”201 The organizational documents in a limited 
liability company202 or a partnership203 do not necessarily 
satisfy this obligation. The assignment can be in any 
agreement signed by the parties, but it must be explicit as to 
the copyright interests being transferred and not merely 
implied by the relationship of the parties.204 
B. JOINT AUTHORSHIP 
Even where work for hire status is applicable to a work, 
there remains an additional copyright doctrine that can come 
into play. Rather than characterizing the relationship as 
employer/employee, a hiring party desiring to retain rights in 
the copyright might claim the work was jointly authored by the 
individual author and the hiring party. 
A work by more than one author is described by the statute 
as a “joint work.”205 “A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or 
more authors with the intention that their contributions be 
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary 
whole.”206 In a joint work, the co-authors are co-owners of the 
copyright in the work and hold undivided interests in the work, 
despite any differences in each other’s contribution.207 Each 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Weinstein Co. v. Smokewood Entm’t Grp., 664 F. Supp. 2d 332, 342 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 202. Woods, 725 F. Supp. at 824. 
 203. Price v. Fox Entm’t Grp., 473 F. Supp. 2d 446, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 204. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006). See, e.g.¸ Woods, 725 F. Supp. at 826. 
 205. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 206. Id. 
 207. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). See Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors 
Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 363 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1740 (2010) 
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joint author “has the right to use or to license the use of the 
work, subject to an accounting to the other co-[authors] for any 
profits.”208 Thus, even a person whose contribution is relatively 
minor enjoys a significant benefit, so long as he is deemed a 
joint author. Joint authors receive the benefit of copyright 
protection for seventy years following the death of the last 
surviving author.209 
Merely because two people collaborate to create a work 
does not make them joint authors.210 The key to joint 
authorship is the intent of the authors at the time the work is 
created to merge their efforts into one work.211 The law does 
not require a signed written agreement to establish joint 
authorship, although such an agreement would eliminate most 
related controversies.212 
In addition, most courts require that each participant 
contribute copyrightable expressions to the work, not just 
ideas.213 This requires that both authors actually write dialog, 
narration, music, or, in the case of software, lines of code. Thus, 
precluding joint authorship where one participant merely 
provides concepts or suggestions.214 Courts have embraced this 
rule in order to prevent the absurd result that the work was 
protected by copyright even though each author’s contribution 
was insufficient to be protected alone.215 Because the threshold 
(holding that a joint work was created where one songwriter contributed only 
10% of the lyrics, but they were significant to the song’s commercial viability.) 
 208. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 209. 17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (2006). If one of the joint authors is an entity, then 
the copyright term will be based on work for hire measures of 95 years from 
publication or 120 from creation, whichever is less. Id. § 302(c). 
 210. See, e.g., Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 211. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 212. For example, a written agreement assigning a treatment for a motion 
picture defeated a claim that the motion picture itself was a joint work. 
Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 213. See, e.g., Ashton-Tate, 916 F.2d at 521. 
 214. See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199–205 (2d Cir. 1998); Erickson v. Trinity 
Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1067–72 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 215. Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 361 
(7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1740 (2010). But see Gaiman v. 
McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2004). Here the court did not 
require each co-author of a comic book character to contribute an 
independently fixed and copyrightable component because “where two or more 
people set out to create a character jointly in such mixed media as comic books 
and motion pictures and succeed in creating a copyrightable character, it 
 522 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 12:2 
 
                                                          
 
for copyright protection is rather low, the contribution of 
expression requirement is usually not too difficult to achieve. 
216 
With respect to software, in Woods v. Resnick, Resnick 
raised the theory that he and Woods were joint authors of the 
auto finance program as an alternative to his work for hire 
claim.217 Nevertheless, the fact that Resnick came up with the 
idea for the dealer finance system and provided directions to 
Woods regarding what the program should do and how it 
should do it was not enough to make him a co-author.218 As to 
Resnick’s other contributions: (1) there was insufficient proof 
that he wrote any lines of code; (2) the incorporation of 
Resnick’s finance formulas on excel spreadsheets did not add 
original copyrightable content, but common ideas; and (3) 
Resnick’s mock-ups of screen displays did not contain 
independently copyrightable expression as they were nearly 
identical to other F&I reports on the market since 1999.219 
Joint authorship is not necessarily desirable as a 
commercial matter. Either author can independently exploit 
the work, so that the authors can become competitors, yet 
neither one can grant exclusive rights to a third party without 
the participation of the other joint owner.220 In addition, the 
requirement to account for profits has had limited 
interpretation.221 In the entertainment area, the calculation of 
profits can be quite complex.222 Where partners intend to be or 
are aware that they are joint authors, they often enter into a 
written agreement waiving the accounting for profits and 
would be paradoxical if[,] though the result of their joint labors had more than 
enough originality and creativity to be copyrightable, no one could claim 
copyright.” Id. 
 216. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) 
(“The sine qua non of copyright is originality. . . . To be sure, the requisite level 
of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.”).  
 217. Woods v. Resnick, 725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 812–13 (W.D. Wis. 2010). 
 218. Id. at 825 (citing Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 658 (“[P]erson who contributes 
merely non-expressive elements to a work, such as ideas, suggestions[,] or 
editorial changes, is not an ‘author’”)). 
 219. Id. at 819–24. 
 220. Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 100 (2nd Cir. 2007) ([I]n order to convey 
exclusive rights, all co-owners must agree to convey their shares of the same 
right). 
 221. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 222. Davis, 505 F.3d at 106 (discussing the difficult process of determining 
damages relating to copyright infringement in the music industry). 
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setting out parameters for licensing their rights. 
VII.  IMPLIED LICENSE 
If the hiring party fails to prove a work for hire 
arrangement, an assignment of copyright, or  joint authorship, 
it still has one last arrow in its quiver to obtain rights in the 
copyrighted work. It can assert that it has an implied 
license.223 Such a license would be non-exclusive because the 
Copyright Act requires that exclusive licenses, a form of 
transfer of copyright ownership, be in writing and signed by the 
owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized 
agent.224 Non-exclusive licenses can be granted orally or by 
implication.225 Where consideration has been paid for the 
creation of the work, the license may be found to be 
irrevocable.226 
Finding an implied license is not automatic. It requires a 
determination that “1) a person (the licensee) request[ed] the 
creation of a work, 2) the creator (the licensor) ma[de] that 
particular work and deliver[ed] it to the licensee who requested 
it, and 3)the licensor intend[ed] that the licensee-requestor 
copy and distribute his work.”227 The intent requirement is 
itself broken out into a three-prong test, i.e., “(1) whether the 
parties were engaged in a short-term discrete transaction as 
opposed to an ongoing relationship; (2) whether the creator 
utilized written contracts . . . providing that copyrighted 
materials could only be used with the creator’s future 
involvement or express permission; and (3) whether the 
creator’s conduct during the creation or delivery of the 
copyrighted material indicated that use of the material without 
the creator’s involvement or consent was permissible.”228 
In Numbers Licensing, LLC v. bVisual USA, Inc., a 
software development company argued for an implied license 
 223. Asset Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d. 748, 754–55 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 224. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “Transfer of Copyright 
Ownership” to include an “exclusive license”); 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006) 
(requirements for transfer of copyright ownership include a signed writing). 
 225. Asset, 542 F.3d at 754. 
 226. Id. at 757; see also 3 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
10.02[B][5] (2010). 
 227. Numbers Licensing LLC v. bVisual USA, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 
1252 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (citing Asset, 542 F.3d at 754–55). 
 228. Asset., 542 F.3d at 756 (citing Danielson v. Winchester-Conant, 322 
F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2003)). 
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after it failed to establish that a program created by Rand 
Renfroe through his personal corporation, Numbers, was a 
work for hire.229 The court held that bVisual obtained an 
implied license to continue using the system’s source code.230 
The parties’ failure to have a written agreement contradicting a 
license, the fact that Numbers did not, despite numerous 
opportunities, deny a license until the relationship ended, that 
Numbers inserted a copyright notice in the code that said 
“Numbers Consulting for bVisual, copyright,” and that 
Numbers was paid a substantial sum in both money and stock 
for the delivery of the code all played into the court’s 
decision.231 The court summed it up thusly, “When a license 
has not been denied and substantial sums of money are paid for 
the copyrighted work, the absence of a licensing agreement 
supports the finding of an implied license.”232 
Where the facts establishing work for hire and joint work 
are controversial and, therefore, not susceptible to resolution 
on a preliminary motion, an implied license provides the 
aggrieved party continued access to the software, pending final 
resolution of the other claims. Credit Bureau Connection Inc. v. 
Pardini presents such a case.233 In Pardini, the parties were 
equal stockholders of Credit Bureau Connection (CBC), a joint 
venture company undertaking the development and marketing 
of finance and insurance software for automobile 
dealerships.234 One stockholder asserted that CBC owned the 
program as a work for hire because, among other things, CBC 
reimbursed the cost of the programming supervisor and his 
assistants and supplied office space and some of the 
development tools.235 The other stockholder, Data Consultants, 
argued that the programmers were its own employees and 
received employment benefits directly from Data 
Consultants.236 
The District Court for the Central District of California 
 229. Numbers, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 1252. 
 230. Id. at 1254. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 1253. 
 233. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc. v. Pardini, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 
1122–23 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
 234. Id. at 1110. 
 235. Id. at 1117. 
 236. Id. at 1117–18. 
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held that CBC did not carry its burden to prove that the 
programmers were employees of CBC or that the programming 
supervisor and CBC made a jointly-authored work.237 However, 
CBC was successful in establishing that it had an implied 
license.238 The software was delivered to CBC for its use; and, 
for nearly three years, CBC marketed the program under its 
own name with unlimited use and access thereto, working with 
the programmers to modify it throughout that time period.239 
The terms of an implied license to software, such as 
whether the license includes the source code, the right to 
modify it, and even the duration of the license, may be 
contested. In Pardini, the license was found to include the right 
to modify the code, was not limited to existing customers, and, 
because the hiring party paid money towards the creation of 
the software, the license was irrevocable.240 In Asset Marketing 
Systems, Inc. v. Gagnon, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
implied license included the source code because the author 
delivered it to Asset Marketing Systems (AMS), the hiring 
party, by installing and storing it on AMS’s computer.241 The 
court also found support for AMS’s right to modify the code by 
reference to the parties’ Technical Services Agreement 
(TSA).242 The TSA stated that Gagnon, the programmer, would 
provide “specific add-on products” for an hourly fee, but did not 
restrict AMS’s own ability to modify the program.243 Finally: 
[I]t defies logic that AMS would have paid Gagnon for his 
programming services if AMS could not have used the programs 
without further payment pursuant to a separate licensing 
arrangement that was never mentioned in the TSA, and never 
otherwise requested at the time. . . . [C]ustom software is far less 
valuable without the ability to modify it.244 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Most business works are created as works made for hire, 
which vests the copyright in the employer rather than the 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 1119–20. 
 239. Id. at 1120, 1126. 
 240. Id. at 1120 (citing Asset Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d. 748, 757 
(9th Cir. 2008) (“a ‘nonexclusive license supported by consideration is a 
contract’ and is irrevocable”)). 
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employee.  The employment relationship will generally depend 
on an existing common law agency relationship between the 
parties. If an employer-employee relationship cannot be 
established, then the work for hire doctrine may still have a 
role for works that fall into enumerated categories, as long as a 
proper written agreement is executed by both parties. 
If there is no employment relationship, the work does not 
fall into one of the nine statutory categories of specially-
commissioned works, and/or there is no adequate written 
agreement characterizing such work as a work for hire or 
otherwise assigning it to the hiring party, then a joint 
authorship may be found. This generally requires that the 
parties share in the creation of the copyrighted aspects of the 
work. If a joint authorship cannot be established, then the 
hiring party may still be able to claim an implied non-exclusive 
license to use the work. 
Establishing a work for hire by an employee in the scope of 
employment, joint authorship, or an implied license does 
require not a written agreement.  Because the record may be 
problematic, a written understanding of the relationship 
between the parties is useful to resolve most copyright 
ownership claims. 
The characterization of a copyrighted work as a work for 
hire, a joint work, an assignment, or a license affects not only 
ownership but also is important to properly characterize 
ownership, length of the copyright term, moral rights, exclusive 
usage, and termination rights. The cases and examples 
provided in this article should help a company navigate the 
landscape of copyright ownership in the ever-changing world of 
cyberspace. 
 
